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Abstract
We consider risk-averse individuals who dier in two characteristics { ability to
benet from education and inherited wealth { and analyze higher education par-
ticipation under two alternative nancing schemes { tax subsidy and (risk-sharing)
income-contingent loans. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, wealthier individ-
uals are more likely to undertake higher education despite the fact that, according
to the stylized nancing schemes we consider, individuals do not pay any up-front
nancial cost of education. We then determine which nancing scheme arises when
individuals are allowed to vote between schemes. We show that the degree of risk
aversion plays a crucial role in determining which nancing scheme obtains a ma-
jority, and that the composition of the support group for each nancing scheme can
be of two dierent types.
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Higher education nancing schemes that rely partly on contributions from students are
being increasingly adopted. One acknowledged problem of relying on cost-sharing by stu-
dents is that liquidity constraints may negatively aect higher education participation.
Even if mortgage-type loans are made available to overcome these liquidity constraints,
education is often viewed as a risky investment, and deserving but risk averse individuals
may decide not to take these loans. Funding schemes that rely on income-contingent
loans, like the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme rst instituted in 1989
or the more recent funding arrangements in the UK, provide insurance against uncer-
tain educational outcomes. Income-contingent loans are hence supposed to partly, if not
fully, overcome the negative eects of risk-aversion, and as such they have been generally
regarded as an improvement on mortgage-type loans to enhance higher education partic-
ipation. The assessment of income-contingent loans versus tax-subsidy schemes, which
have been traditionally employed in many European countries to nance higher education,
is less conclusive.
Financing schemes for higher education dier in the way educational costs and risks
are shared among the population. Garc a-Pe~ nalosa and W alde (2000) and Del Rey and
Racionero (2010) are among the few theoretical contributions in the literature that con-
sider a relatively comprehensive set of higher education nancing alternatives, including
both tax-subsidy and income-contingent loans. In Garc a-Pe~ nalosa and W alde (2000)
individuals are assumed to dier only in inheritance, whereas in Del Rey and Racionero
(2010) individuals dier only in ability. When individuals dier in inheritance, the social
optimum implies that either none or all should study. When individuals dier in ability,
it is possible to determine an optimum threshold ability level (i.e. an optimal level of
participation in higher education) and assess whether alternative nancing schemes yield
insucient or excessive participation. Indeed, Del Rey and Racionero (2010) focus on
the eects of the insurance and subsidy components of alternative nancing schemes on
participation, and show that an income-contingent loan with risk-pooling can induce the
2optimal level of participation provided that it covers both nancial costs of education and
forgone earnings. However, universal income-contingent loans of the risk-pooling type,
where successful students are essentially responsible for the full cost of the education
of their cohort, are relatively rare. Tax-subsidy schemes, where the cost of education is
nanced by general taxes, have been historically common, particularly in Europe. Income-
contingent loans of the risk-sharing type, where successful graduates contribute to a large
extent to the cost of their education, possibly the full cost if there are no implicit subsi-
dies, and the cost of the education of unsuccessful students is nanced by general taxes,
are being increasingly adopted or considered (see Chapman (2006) for an overview of the
international experience with income-contingent loans).
In this paper we focus on the tax-subsidy and risk-sharing income-contingent loans
schemes. Contrary to Garc a-Pe~ nalosa and W alde (2000) and Del Rey and Racionero
(2010) we consider individuals that dier in two characteristics: ability and inherited
wealth. In this sense the model follows De Fraja (2001), which incorporates both dif-
ferences in parental income and ability, but departs in other respects: most notably,
we incorporate income-contingent loans as a nancing scheme option. We analyze par-
ticipation under both schemes, paying particular attention to the welfare individuals of
dierent ability and wealth achieve under each. We use this information subsequently to
study which nancing scheme is preferred by a majority when individuals are able to vote
between the two schemes.
Recent contributions dealing with the political economy of higher education nance
include De Fraja (2001), Anderberg and Balestrino (2008), and Borck and Wimbersky
(2009). De Fraja (2001) considers two education policies - an admission test and a subsidy
nanced out of general taxation - and shows that both enhance equality of opportunity,
but have ambiguous equity and eciency eects. The ambiguous equity eects of the
policies are reected in the voting behavior of individuals: when voting on the extent
of the subsidy a partial "ends against the middle" phenomenon arises where better-o
households unambiguously like a lower subsidy as would some worse-o households with
3less able children, whereas the poor households with more able children prefer an increase
in the subsidy. Anderberg and Ballestrino (2008) consider tax-subsidy schemes in a model
where endogenous credit constraints play a key role and show that a voting equilibrium, if
it exists, is such that voters in the two tails of the income distribution support a reduction,
while the \middle-class" supports an expansion, of the education subsidy. Borck and
Wimbersky (2009) study voting over higher education nancing schemes in an economy
where risk averse households dier in wealth and wages are endogenously determined.
They consider four alternative systems: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme,
income-contingent loans and graduate taxes. Their numerical simulations suggest that
poor households tend to prefer traditional tax-subsidy nancing to graduate taxes or
income-contingent loans, due to a positive eect on endogenous unskilled wages, and
that majorities for income-contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely if risk-
aversion increases and/or the income distribution is less unequal. We incorporate an
additional dimension of individual heterogeneity: ability. The nancing schemes that we
study are relatively inexible, when compared to the exible endogenous subsidy rates
that Borck and Wimbersky (2009) consider, but by concentrating on the choice between
schemes we are able to provide relatively clear and intuitive results.
We focus exclusively on the choice between tax-subsidy and (risk-sharing) income-
contingent loans because they are two of the most commonly employed higher education
nance schemes and several countries are switching, or planning to do so, from the former
to the latter. Many countries have progressively introduced, or raised, their tuition fees
to be able to support an increasing number of students. The British government, for
instance, rst introduced upfront charges for students in 1998. They were replaced in
England in 2004 with a scheme with higher fees but that allowed students to receive
income-contingent loans, designed in such a way that students eectively share the risk
with the general taxpayer: there is no real interest rate charged on the loan, students
start to repay only after they earn more than a threshold level of income, among other
concessions. In late 2010 proposed tuition fees increases in England, which in some cases
4were expected to triple the fees previously charged, generated some heated protests from
students. At the same time the British government was seeking to slash its direct funding
of university teaching, which should put less pressure on, and be hence supported by, the
average taxpayer. This paper aims to shed more light on the political economy aspects
of the switch from tax-subsidy to risk-sharing income-contingent loans schemes.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst present the model and describe each
nancing scheme in section 2. In section 3 we determine the tax that is required under
each nancing scheme for a given participation level. In section 4 we analyze participation
and in section 5 we characterize the voting outcome. We conclude in section 6.
2 The model
We consider an economy in which a continuum of individuals of mass N live for 2 periods.
Individuals dier in their ability a and their initial wealth b, which we take as exogenously




. That is, each individual is characterised by a





. The marginal distributions are denoted by F (a) with F 0 (a) = f (a), and
H (b) with H0 (b) = h(b).
Individuals derive utility from consumption, c, which depends on wealth and earned
income over the lifetime. We assume a von Neumann-Morgensten utility function u(c)
with, for every c > 0, u0 (c) > 0;u00 (c)  0; lim









(i.e. the utility function displays decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)).
In the rst period, the individual decides whether or not to undertake higher education.
Individuals who study forego earnings wL in the rst period. In the second period all
individuals work and earn income. If the individual invested in education, her labour
market income is given by wH with probability p(a), and by wL < wH with probability
51   p(a), with p(a) 2 (0;1), with p0 (a) > 0 for all a 2 [a;a]. If the individual did not go
to university, then her income is given by wL for sure.
There are three possible states: the individual studies and is successful, the individual
studies and is unsuccessful or the individual does not study. We denote them by subscripts
S, U and N respectively. Labour supply is exogenous and is normalized to 1. Hence, the
lifetime earned labour income of the individual is wH, wL and (1 + )wL, where  is
the discount factor, for individuals S, U and N respectively. We assume that wH >
(1 + )wL.
We denote by k the per capita cost of education. The government provides education
free of charge in the rst period and raises the necessary revenue in the second period in
a manner that diers according to the nancing scheme. A potentially dierent amount
of individuals Hj, where j represents the funding scheme, enrol in higher education in
the rst period. We focus on two nancing schemes for higher education: tax-subsidy,
denoted by TS, and risk-sharing income-contingent loan, denoted by IC. In the tax-
subsidy system, the cost of education is nanced by general lump-sum taxes in the second
period. We model the income-contingent loan as the risk-sharing income-contingent loan
in Del Rey and Racionero (2010): all individuals who want to study borrow k, only those
individuals who are successful have to repay the amount in full, and a lump-sum tax is
levied on all individuals in order to raise the revenue needed to cover the education cost
of unsuccessful students.
The timing of decisions is the following: rst individuals choose by majority voting
the higher education nancing scheme. Then, for the higher education nancing scheme
chosen, they decide whether or not to participate. Finally, they contribute. We start by
determining the level of lump-sum taxes required for each nancing scheme for a given
level of participation.
63 Tax cost of alternative schemes
Let aTS (b) denote the threshold ability level (i.e. the ability level of an individual who
is indierent between studying or not) of an individual with wealth b for the tax-subsidy


















Let aIC (b) now denote the ability level of an individual with wealth b who is indierent
between studying or not for the income-contingent nancing scheme. The number of

















(1   p(a))f (a)h(b)dadb: (4)
4 Participation
For a given higher education nance scheme and anticipating the lump-sum contribution,
individuals decide whether or not to enrol. We rst identify the optimal level of partici-
pation that we use as a benchmark against which we compare the participation achieved
for each scheme.
4.1 Optimal participation
Focusing exclusively on eciency, it is optimal that an individual studies when her ex-
pected earnings as a student net of the cost of her education exceed her earnings as
7a non-student. It is possible to determine a threshold ability level, b a, above which an
individual should study and below which an individual should not study:
 [p(b a)wH + (1   p(b a))wL]   k = (1 + )wL: (5)
The optimal amount of graduates is H =
R a
b a f(a)da: Note that the optimal ability level
is independent of family wealth b.
4.2 Tax-subsidy
Let GTS (a;b) denote the expected net utility gain from investing in higher education
under the tax-subsidy scheme for an individual with ability a and wealth b:
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0 (a)[u(b + wH)   u(b + wL)] > 0 (7)
since p0 (a) > 0 and wH > wL. Higher ability individuals have larger expected utility from
studying than lower ability individuals, and are hence more likely to undertake higher
education.
The threshold ability level of an individual with wealth b for the tax-subsidy nancing
scheme, aTS (b), satises GTS  
aTS (b);b
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= 0, then aTS is unique and the function aTS (b) is strictly decreasing
in b.




there exists a level of
ability aTS 2 [a;a] such that GTS  
aTS;b
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given (7) (for a given level of b the expected net gain of investing in higher education
increases with ability) and
@GTS (:)
@b
 (1   p(a))u
0  









b + (1 + )wL   T
IC
> 0
(for a given level of a a higher income individual is more willing to bear risk and invest
in higher education due to the DARA assumption).
This result was previously proven by De Fraja (2001) in a slightly dierent setting
with two coexisting generations - mother and daughter - where the mother makes the
decisions: most notably she chooses her own consumption, a monetary transfer to her
daughter and how much to invest in her daughter's education, as well as voting on the
tax rate that is imposed on the mother's income to subsidize the costs of education and
that has to be paid irrespective of whether the daughter studies or not.1
The fact that aTS (b) is strictly decreasing in b implies that wealthier individuals are
more likely to undertake higher education. This is so despite the fact that, under the
scheme considered, individuals do not pay upfront any nancial cost of education. The
presence of foregone earnings and the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion play
crucial roles. Investment in education is risky and when individuals display decreasing
absolute risk aversion the wealthier ones are more willing to bear risk; in other words,
they require a lower expected return in order to opt for an investment of a given riskiness.
The threshold ability does not depend on b in the particular case of risk neutrality
since b, and T TS as well, cancel out from the equation:
G
TS (a;b) = (1   p(a))wL + p(a)wH   (1 + )wL = G
TS (a): (11)
1Maxine Montaigne's 2010 ANU Economics Honours Sub-thesis replicated De Fraja (2001)'s result in
a model with two generations, but with no mother's own consumption or intergenerational transfer and
similar schemes to the ones we employ.
9We denote by b aTS the threshold ability level of risk neutral individuals under the tax-
subsidy system.
Proposition 2 Risk neutral individuals overinvest in education under TS: b aTS < b a.













= (1 + )wL: (12)













=  [p(b a)wH + (1   p(b a))wL]   k:
It follows that b aTS < b a.
Proposition 3 Risk aversion reduces participation for all income levels: aTS(b) > b aTS
8b.









































since, with risk aversion, the utility of expected income is higher than the expected utility.
Using (7) and GTS  
aTS (b);b







Since b aTS < b a and b aTS < aTS (b) participation could be ecient under the tax subsidy
scheme for risk averse individuals with a particular level of wealth. In contrast, it is not
possible that aTS (b) = b a for all b since aTS (b) is strictly decreasing. If participation
was ecient for individuals with a given threshold wealth, denoted by b b, then below b b
individuals would be under-represented, and aboveb b individuals would be over-represented
in higher education.
Example. In order to illustrate how dierent degrees of risk aversion aect partici-
pation we represent in Figures 1-3 the ecient participation together with participation
10under the tax-subsidy scheme when individuals are risk neutral and risk averse (the shaded
area represents participation when individuals are risk averse). In the simulation, we use





where  =  c
u00(c)
u0(c) represents the coecient of relative risk aversion. Borck and Wimber-
sky (2009) employ  = 2:25 but Brodaty et al. (2010) suggest  = 0:75 as reasonable for
the education decision. We compare the results for three dierent degrees of risk aversion
: 0.75 (low), 1.5 (intermediate) and 3 (high). The other parameters are set the same
throughout: the low skilled wage is normalized to 1, the skilled wage is assumed to be
3, the cost of higher education is assumed to be 0.5 and  = 1:5.2 We also set p(a) = a
and calculate T TS according to (2). Both wealth and ability are assumed to be uniformly
distributed in the population between 0 and 1. 3
4.3 Income-contingent loan
Let now GIC (a;b) denote the expected net utility gain from investing in higher education
for an individual with ability a and wealth b under the risk-sharing income-contingent
loan (IC) scheme:
G
IC (a;b)  (1   p(a))u
 









b + (1 + )wL   T
IC
: (14)
2According to the OECD (Chart A7.2 Education at a Glance 2010) the ratio of earnings from employ-
ment with tertiary type A and advanced programs relative to below upper secondary education ranges
from aprox 1,5 (New Zealand, Australia) to 5 (Brazil). Direct costs of higher education are typically
smaller than forgone costs (Chart A8.3 Education at a Glance 2010). A discount factor of 1.5 is chosen
to account for the fact that although the individuals discount the future the second period is longer than
the rst period.
3We have also considered an alternative lognormal distribution, with a higher density of individuals
at lower income levels. The qualitative results remain the same but the uniform distribution is more
tractable and convenient for the graphical illustration.











Figure 1: Participation under TS: risk neutrality versus risk aversion (=0.75)











Figure 2: Participation under TS: risk neutrality versus risk aversion (=1.5)











Figure 3: Participation under TS: risk neutrality versus risk aversion (=3)
The expected net utility gain from investing in higher education also increases with ability













b + wL   T
IC
> 0 (15)









aIC (b) is unique.
@GIC(:)









That is, aIC (b) is strictly decreasing in b, which proves the following proposition:








= 0, then aIC is unique and the function aIC (b) is strictly decreasing in
b.






 (wH   wL) = wL + p(b a
IC)k: (17)
It follows that b aTS < b aIC < b a: On the one hand, higher education participation is lower
than with the tax-subsidy system. This is due to the fact that the cost of education is
partly subsidized by non-students but to a lesser extent than in the tax-subsidy system.
At the same time, more individuals get educated than at the optimum since, in expected
terms, students are only responsible for part of the cost of their education. Note that the
expected cost of becoming educated is p(a)k, which is smaller than k; since the lump-sum
tax contribution is paid irrespective of whether the individual studies or not.
Proposition 5 Risk neutral individuals overinvest in education under IC, but less so
than under TS: b aTS < b aIC < b a:
Finally,
Proposition 6 Risk aversion reduces participation for all income levels: aIC(b) > b aIC
8b.










































since, with risk aversion, the utility of expected income is higher than the expected utility.
Since (15) and GIC  
aIC (b);b







Example. As in Del Rey and Racionero (2010) it is not possible to provide a general
ordering of higher education participation under alternative nancing schemes when indi-
viduals are risk averse. This is so because for both schemes participation decreases with











Figure 4: Participation with risk aversion: TS vs IC ( = 1:5)
risk aversion but it does so at dierent rates and the theoretical possibility of participa-
tion becoming larger with the income-contingent loan, relative to the tax-subsidy scheme,
cannot be ruled out for suciently large degrees of risk aversion. We perform however
some numerical simulations to shed more light on the relative magnitude of degree of
risk aversion required. Figure 4 represents the ecient participation together with the
participation thresholds for both TS and IC for the benchmark parameter specication
described above (the shaded area represents the dierence in participation between the
two schemes). IC yields lower participation for the values of  considered reasonable.
Increasing the degree of risk aversion coecient from  = 1:5 to  =3 decreases partici-
pation for both schemes, and the dierence in participation becomes smaller (see Figure
5).
5 Voting over the nancing scheme
In this section we analyze the preferences of individuals concerning the higher education
nancing scheme when they are able to anticipate both participation decisions and the
corresponding lump-sum tax. We do so rst for the benchmark case of risk neutrality, to











Figure 5: Participation with risk aversion: TS vs IC ( = 3)
provide intuition, and proceed next to the more relevant case of risk aversion.
5.1 Risk neutrality
We showed above that b aTS < b aIC < b a: Since participation is lower and graduates con-
tribute more with the income-contingent loan scheme, it follows that T TS > T IC: We
explore rst whether it is possible to identify an ability threshold below which one nanc-
ing scheme is preferred and above which the other one is preferred instead. In that case
we can compare the number of individuals at each side of the threshold and conclude
what the majority prefers. We are able to establish the following:




there exists a threshold aI 2

b aTS;b aIC
below which individuals prefer IC and above which
individuals prefer TS. If T TS > T IC + kp
 
b aIC
, the threshold becomes aII > b aIC.
Proof. Below b aTS, individuals do not study regardless of the nancing scheme and
they prefer IC because they pay less. In the range

b aTS;b aIC
individuals study with TS
16but do not study with IC. They prefer IC if and only if
b + (1 + )wL   T
IC > (1   p(a))
 




b + wH   T
TS
;
which can be simplied to
p(a) <
wL + T TS   T IC
 (wH   wL)
:
If there exits an ability level in the range

b aTS;b aIC
such that the individual is indierent
between the two schemes we denote this ability threshold, below which individuals prefer






wL + T TS   T IC
 (wH   wL)
: (18)
Individuals with a > b aIC study regardless of the scheme in place and they prefer IC when
they are required to contribute less: i.e., if and only if T IC +p(a)k < T TS: If there exists
an ability level above b aIC such that the individual is indierent between the two schemes
we denote this ability threshold by aII and it satises
p(a
II) =










 (wH   wL)   k
:
If p(b aIC) >
 
T TS   T IC
=k, there does not exist an ability threshold aII above b aIC.
Individuals with ability b aIC prefer TS and this is also the case for all individuals with




above which individuals prefer TS and below which individuals prefer
IC.
If, on the other hand, p(b aIC) <
 
T TS   T IC
=k then individuals with ability b aIC prefer
IC. Some individuals with a > b aIC prefer IC and there exists a threshold aII > b aIC below
which individuals prefer IC and above which individuals prefer TS. All individuals with
a < b aIC prefer IC. To check this it suces to show that the condition for the existence
17of a threshold aI in the range

b aTS;b aIC






wL + T TS   T IC
 (wH   wL)
>
wL
 (wH   wL)   k
= p(b a
IC)
if and only if










k >  (wH   wL)wL;
which can be simplied to p(b aIC) <
 
T TS   T IC
=k:
Those who do not study under any scheme prefer the income-contingent loan because
they pay less (if participation is less than 50% under both schemes, the income-contingent
loan is the trivial outcome from voting). Among those who study with the tax-subsidy
scheme but not with the income-contingent loan two things can happen: either some
(those with relatively lower ability) prefer the income-contingent loan or all of them do




with ability a 2

b aIC;aI
prefer not to study with the income-contingent loan rather than
study with the tax-subsidy: their probability of success is suciently low that they prefer
not to forego earnings in the rst period and pay a relatively lower contribution T IC
in the second. The second case occurs when p(b aIC)k + T IC < T TS (i.e., the expected
total payment with the income-contingent loan is smaller than the payment with the tax-
subsidy scheme for the individuals who are indierent between studying or not with the
income-contingent loan scheme): individuals with ability b aIC prefer the income-contingent
loan, and so do all individuals with lower ability, even if they would have studied with the
tax-subsidy scheme. In this case the relevant threshold is aII > b aIC and only a subset of
those who study regardless of the scheme in place prefer the tax-subsidy: namely, those
individuas with relatively higher ability, who are more likely to be successful and expect
to repay more with the income-contingent loan. The key dierence is that, while in the
rst case some of those who support the tax-subsidy would not access higher education
if oered income-contingent loans instead, in the second case all those who support the
tax-subsidy study under both schemes and simply prefer to pay less.
185.2 Risk aversion
As mentioned above, with risk averse individuals it is not possible to determine in general
which scheme induces more participation. In the simulations discussed above, however,
the tax-subsidy induces more participation than the income-contingent loan for most
reasonable degrees of risk aversion. We concentrate hereafter on situations of this type:




individuals do not study with any of the













e aTS (b);e aIC (b)

individuals study with the tax-subsidy scheme but do not
study with the risk-sharing income-contingent loan, and they prefer IC when
u
 
b + (1 + )wL   T
IC
> (1   p(a))u
 




b + wH   T
TS
:
If for a given wealth b there exits an ability level in the range

e aTS (b);e aIC (b)

such that
the individual is indierent between the two schemes, we denote this ability threshold,










b + (1 + )wL   T IC
  u
 
b + wL   T TS
(u(b + wH   T TS)   u(b + wL   T TS))
: (20)
Let G(a;b) be the utility dierential between studying with TS and not studying
with IC:
G
(a;b) = (1   p(a))u
 












G(a;b) is increasing in a: If we evaluate it at e aIC (b) we obtain two possibilities:
1. If G(e aIC (b);b) > 0 then e aI (b) < e aIC (b) and every individual with wealth b and
ability above e aIC (b) prefers TS (expected utility of education is larger under TS for
e aIC (b) and hence it is so for all a > e aIC (b)). Then the decisive individual is e aI (b):
192. If G(e aIC (b);b) < 0 then e aI (b) > e aIC (b): Everyone in the region

e aTS (b);e aIC (b)

prefers IC and some individuals above e aIC (b) also prefer IC. It can be shown that
there is a second threshold e aII (b) > e aIC (b) that becomes the relevant one.
The outcome that ultimately emerges, and whether the individuals with ability e aI (b)
or e aII (b) are the decisive ones, depends on the particular combination of parameters. To
explore their role, and in particular the eect of the degree of risk aversion, we report
some examples below. When e aI (b) is the decisive threshold, support for the tax-subsidy
scheme comes from all individuals who study irrespective of the nancing scheme and
some individuals who study under the tax-subsidy but would not do so if oered income-
contingent loans. When e aII (b) is the decisive threshold, support for the tax-subsidy
scheme comes exclusively from some but not all of the individuals who study irrespective
of the scheme: those individuals with relatively higher ability and wealth. Note that,
contrary to the benchmark case of risk neutrality explored above, the decisive ability
thresholds e aI (b) and e aII (b) are decreasing in wealth: this is due to the fact that absolute
risk aversion decreases with wealth.
In situations where participation in higher education with TS is below 50% the out-
come of the choice between the two stylized schemes that we consider is trivial: the
income-contingent loan would be preferred since the majority of individuals do not study
and they prefer to pay less for the education of others. We concentrate next mostly on
examples where the combination of parameters adopted yields higher education partici-
pation in excess of 50%.4
5.2.1 Example 1: the majority supports TS with e aI(b) decisive
With the benchmark parameter values used before and for  = 0:75 we obtain that a
majority supports TS with e aI(b) being the decisive ability threshold. In this example, we
represent the thresholds e aTS(b) and e aIC(b), together with e aI(b) 2

e aTS (b);e aIC (b)

(see
Figure 6). e aIC(b) and e aTS(b) and both are below 0.5, for all b: more than half of the
4The OECD Education at a Glance 2010 Chart A2.5 suggests participation in higher education in
OECD countries ranges from below 30% to above 70%.











Figure 6: Majority for TS with e aI(b) decisive
population studies under any of the two schemes and, thus, those who never study do
not have the majority of the vote. The threshold e aI(b) 2

e aTS (b);e aIC (b)

determines the
support for each scheme for all b: all those below e aI(b) support IC (the shaded area, above
e aI(b); which represents more than 50% of the population, supports TS). The support for
TS comes from all those who study regarless of the scheme, and some but not all those
who study with TS but would not do so with IC (the less able and less wealthy in this
group, with relatively higher probability of failure and higher absolute risk aversion, prefer
not to study and pay T IC).
5.2.2 Example 2: the majority supports IC with e aI(b) decisive
For the same benchmark parameter values employed above but for a degree of risk aversion
 = 1:5 we obtain that a majority supports IC with e aI(b) 2

e aTS (b);e aIC (b)

as the
decisive ability threshold for all b. Increasing the degree of risk aversion to  = 3 we obtain
the same qualitative result with an even larger support for IC. The intuitive explanation
is that as risk aversion increases participation levels decrease for both schemes (and hence
support from non-students for IC becomes larger). In addition, with a larger degree of











Figure 7: Majority for IC with e aI(b) decisive
risk aversion the IC scheme, which provides more insurance, becomes relatively more
attractive. We again represent, in Figure 7, the thresholds e aTS(b) and e aIC(b), together
with e aI(b) 2

e aTS (b);e aIC (b)

. All those below e aI(b) support IC (the shaded area, which
represents in this case less than 50% of the population, supports TS): The support for IC
comes from those who never study, and some - the relatively less able and less wealthy -
who would study with TS and do not with IC.
5.2.3 Example 3: the majority supports IC with e aII (b) decisive
If from the benchmark parameter values we increase  to 3, to capture a larger weight of
future earnings relative to present foregone earnings and cost of education, participation
becomes relatively more attractive. In the case of  = 3 we obtain that a majority supports
IC but the decisive individuals are characterized by e aII (b) > e aIC(b) for all wealth values
b.5 All those below e aII (b) support IC (the shaded area, above e aII (b), which represents
5If from the set of parameter values used in example 2, where  = 1:5; we just increase  to 3 (not
reported graphically here to save space) we obtain that e aI(b) is the relevant threshold for less wealthy
individuals whereas e aII(b) is the relevant threshold for wealthier individuals. Less wealthy individuals
have a higher absolute risk aversion and a higher proportion of them tends to support the IC scheme,
which provides more insurance.











Figure 8: Majority for IC with e aII (b) decisive
in this case less than 50% of the population, supports TS): The composition of the group
that supports IC diers from example 2. Those who prefer IC now include those who
never study, all those who would study with TS but do not study with IC, and some
of those who study regardless of the scheme in place. The support for TS comes from a
subset of students who participate regardless of the scheme in place and prefer to pay less:
namely, those with higher ability and wealth, who have a higher probability of success
and and a lower absolute risk aversion. These individuals expect to pay more with, and
value less the insurance features of, the income-contingent loan scheme.
6 Conclusions
We consider individuals who dier in two characteristics { ability to benet from education
and inherited wealth { and analyze higher education participation under two alternative
nancing schemes { tax subsidy and risk-sharing income-contingent loans {, paying par-
ticular attention to the welfare achieved by individuals with dierent ability and wealth
under each. Wealthier individuals are more likely to undertake higher education despite
the fact that they do not pay in advance for their education: the presence of foregone
23earnings and the assumption of decreasing relative risk aversion play crucial roles in this
result.
We then study which nancing scheme arises when individuals are allowed to vote be-
tween them. We do so both for the benchmark case of risk neutrality and for risk aversion.
We identify ability thresholds that allow to determine the magnitude of the support for the
alternative nancing schemes. Those individuals with ability below the threshold ability
support the income-contingent loan scheme whereas those with higher ability support the
tax-subsidy scheme. In order to shed more light we perform numerical simulations. For
a set of benchmark parameter values, a change in the degree of risk aversion switches the
majority support from the tax-subsidy scheme to the income-contingent loan. The com-
position of the group that supports the alternative schemes may also change depending on
the parameter values. We obtain cases in which the support for tax-subsidy comes from
those who always study, and some (those with relatively higher ability and wealth) who
study with tax-subsidy and not with income-contingent loans. The higher probability
of success of higher ability individuals induces them to support the tax-subsidy instead
of the income-contingent loan scheme because they expect to contribute more under the
latter; the lower absolute risk aversion of wealthier individuals reduces their demand for
schemes that provide insurance, and hence their support for income-contingent loans. We
also obtain cases in which the support for the tax-subsidy scheme comes exclusively from
some (those with relatively higher ability and wealth) who always study. In this case
all those who do not study, all those who would study with tax-subsidy but not with
income-contingent loans and some (those with relatively lower ability and wealth) who
study with both schemes support income-contingent loans. In the numerical simulations
we show that such a case arises when the degree of risk aversion is particularly large
making the income-contingent loans, which provide insurance, relatively more attractive.
The way in which we model the alternative nancing schemes is rather inexible: in
particular, the taxes the individuals are required to pay to contribute to the cost of higher
education are lump-sum, and are calculated from the budget constraint. As a result indi-
24viduals do not vote on the tax (or subsidy) rate, as is the case in other contributions in the
literature, but on the overall nancing scheme. This approach provides relatively clearcut
and intuitive insights. It would nevertheless be worth exploring alternative taxation rules
and we plan to do so in future research.
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